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Abstract
In this paper we use a non-taˆtonnement dynamic macroeco-
nomic model to study the role of inventories, expectations
and wages in the business cycle. Following a restrictive mon-
etary shock, by amplifying spillover effects inventories may
imply that the economy converges to a deflationary locally
stable Keynesian underemployment state. The model is ap-
plied to evaluate economic policies like quantitative easing
as well as the effectiveness of holding inflationary expec-
tations to recover to full employment. If inflationary ex-
pectations are not sufficient, imposing downward rigidity of
nominal wages helps to exit from the recession.
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1 Introduction
Why money affects output and why it has long lasting effects have
long been central questions for the business cycle literature, if not
for all of macroeconomics. This is especially so because, as stressed
for instance by Blanchard (2000), the empirical evidence is irre-
mediably at odds with the conclusions of the flex-price models.
If prices were fully flexible, an increase in nominal money would
immediately induce a proportional increase in the price level off-
setting any pressure on demand and output, and money would be
neutral even in the short run. Prices and wages, however, do not
change instantaneously: they exhibit a certain degree of stickiness
and individual price changes tend to be staggered, which makes
the adjustment process of the price level more or less slow. During
the process, aggregate demand and output are higher than their
original values, and the change in the money stock has real effects.
Eventually, most economists maintain, the price level will adjust
proportionally to the increase in the nominal money stock, so that
demand and output will be back at their original levels, and money
neutrality will be restored. Before this occurs, real and nominal
rigidities, lying behind the slow adjustment of prices and wages,
are the causes of the temporary non-neutrality of money.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the New Keynesian litera-
ture (see e.g. Ball and Romer, 1990, and Blanchard, 1987 and
1990) has emphasized that monetary shocks determine large ag-
gregate effects when small frictions in nominal adjustment are
supplemented by real rigidities.1 Attention has been devoted as
well to the sources of nominal stickiness focusing, for instance, on
1Many causes of real rigidities have been investigated in the literature:
among others, efficiency wages (see, for example, Solow, 1979, and Shapiro and
Stiglitz, 1984), implicit contracts (Azariadis, 1975, and Baily, 1974), counter-
cyclical mark-ups (Stiglitz, 1984, Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986, and Rotem-
berg and Woodford, 1991), inventories (Blinder, 1982), social customs (Ak-
erlof, 1980, and Romer, 1984), strategic interactions and coordination failure
(Ball and Romer, 1991), credit markets imperfections (Bernanke and Gertler,
1989 and 1995, Holmstro¨m and Tirole, 1997, 1998, and Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997) and increasing returns (Kiyotaki, 1988, and Diamond, 1982).
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menu cost or near rationality (e.g. Mankiw, 1985, and Akerlof and
Yellen, 1985), staggered contracts (Calvo, 1983), optimal wage in-
dexation by wage-setting trade unions in an economy subject to
real and monetary shocks (Benassy, 1995), and uncertainty and
risk aversion (Weinrich, 1997).
In this paper, we aim to show that both claims presented in the
theoretical literature – about the long-run money neutrality and
the effectiveness of price flexibility to lead the economy quickly
back to the pre-shock state – do not necessarily hold. On the
contrary, money can affect the output level in the long run and
price and wage flexibility can foster this result, while wage rigidity
may prove a good recipe to avoid or overcome permanent under-
employment.
Our framework is a discrete-time dynamic non-taˆtonnement
macroeconomic model, building on Colombo and Weinrich (2003)
and Bignami, Colombo and Weinrich (2004). The economy con-
sists of an OLG consumption sector, a production sector and a
government that finances public expenditure by means of a tax
levied on firms’ profits. Within each period prices are fixed and
a consistent allocation is obtained by means of a temporary equi-
librium with stochastic rationing whereas prices are adjusted be-
tween successive periods according to the strength of rationing or
disequilibrium on each market in the previous period.2 This ap-
proach permits to account for the fact that in any economy with
decentralized price setting the “adjustment of the general level of
prices in terms of the numeraire is likely to be slow relative to a
(fictional) economy with an auctioneer”, as emphasized by Blan-
2A natural idea is to relate the adjustment of prices to the size of the dis-
satisfaction of agents with their (foregone) trades. A reliable measure of such a
dissatisfaction requires stochastic rationing, since - as opposed to deterministic
rationing - it is compatible with manipulability of the rationing mechanism and
therefore provides an incentive for rationed agents to express demands that
exceed their expected trades, as argued by Green (1980), Svensson (1980),
Douglas Gale (1979, 1981), Honkapohja and Ito (1985) and Weinrich (1982,
1984, 1988). For a definition of manipulability see for example Bo¨hm (1989)
or Weinrich (1988).
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chard (2000, p. 1393). It is important to stress that the way we
model the price/wage adjustment mechanism allows us to account
quite naturally for different degrees of price and wage flexibility.
Although our adjustment mechanism is given exogenously – and
thus it may be considered ad hoc – it allows us to assess the im-
pact of price and wage reactions to shocks generated by different
underlying conceptual models. In other words, it is “agnostic”
enough to provide a framework to study the impact of real and
nominal rigidities in the New Keynesian tradition.
The novelty of the economy developed here with respect to
the one considered in our previous papers is twofold. On the one
hand, we abandon the simplifying assumption that there are no
inventories. In the present paper, inventories are possible and
stored goods may be sold in periods subsequent to the period of
their production. Likewise, consumers may store goods bought in
their first period of life to consume them in their second. More
precisely, at the beginning of each period the stock of inventories
carried by each firm is given by the firm’s output that remains
unsold at the end of the previous period. In this sense, inventories
are not used as ‘strategic’ decision variables by firms which makes
our treatment of inventories different from, and simpler than, most
of the accounts present in the recent literature (see, for instance,
Blinder and Fischer, 1981, and Blinder, 1982, where firms have a
target inventory level and want to keep a certain inventories-to-sale
ratio). However, in our model as well, the explicit consideration of
inventories adds a further propagation mechanism for shocks and
amplifies the importance of the spillover effects among markets.
On the other hand, and equally important, we look at the role
that consumers’ expectations play in explaining the persistence
of shocks. The constructive approach by which we model them
results in a truly forward looking dynamics with perfect foresight
along any trajectory. If expectations are deflationary the economy
may get stuck in an unemployment equilibrium, whereas if they
are inflationary full employment is possible.
To highlight one of the main results of the paper where the two
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features discussed above play an important role, consider a restric-
tive monetary shock that, starting from a Walrasian equilibrium,
reduces aggregate demand, inducing excess supply on the goods
market and, consequently, a reduction in the goods price. The de-
crease in aggregate demand reduces labor demand and gives rise
to an excess supply on the labor market as well, i.e. to Keynesian
unemployment. Whenever the nominal wage is rigid downward,
the real wage and the real money stock increase until the econ-
omy leaves the state of Keynesian unemployment to enter a state
of Classical unemployment, that is excess demand on the goods
market and excess supply on the labor market. At this point the
goods price starts to increase again, determining a reduction of the
real wage and of the real money stock until the economy converges
back to a full-employment equilibrium.
The process changes quite dramatically when there is down-
ward wage flexibility. In this case, the monetary shock determines
a reduction of the nominal wage that, if it is large enough, implies
a decrease of the real wage, too.3 The presence of inventories sig-
nificantly reinforces this reduction, by increasing the fall of labor
demand, which in turn depresses labor income and aggregate de-
mand. The real wage continues to fall, although ever more slowly.
Eventually the economy converges to a quasi-stationary Keynesian
state with a constant low real wage, permanent unemployment and
permanent deflation of the nominal variables.4 Therefore down-
ward nominal wage flexibility favors a lasting impact of monetary
shocks whereas imposing downward nominal wage rigidity appears
to be a viable policy to prevent the emergence of deflationary re-
cessions or at least limit their extent and duration.
Moreover, we suggest, by means of numerical simulations, that
such recessionary quasi-stationary equilibria are locally stable while
the stationary Walrasian equilibrium is unstable. Specifically, re-
3As discussed in Section 7, in Japan over several years a decrease both of
the nominal wage and of prices did result in a repeated decrease of the real
wage.
4Quasi-stationary means constant real but varying nominal variables.
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ductions in the real money stock or in real profits, and increases in
the stock of inventories, destroy the full employment equilibrium
and cause the economy to converge to a quasi-stationary Keyne-
sian equilibrium.
Besides the theoretical underpinnings on the role and conse-
quences of inventories and expectations dynamics the paper is,
as we think, of interest in a policy perspective. Our setup is,
in fact, able to account for the dynamic behavior of economies
that are trapped in situations of underemployment or underuti-
lization of the productive capacity. This proves useful in evalu-
ating the impact of alternative policy measures aimed at restor-
ing full employment. In this respect, we use our economy as a
test bank to investigate the prolonged deflationary behavior of
the Japanese economy since the early 1990s and to evaluate the
performance of different monetary policies designed to stimulate
the economy. More precisely, the recessionary Keynesian equilib-
rium of our economy seems to reproduce quite well the essential
features of the Japanese deflation, providing a suitable framework
to discuss the impact of different economic policies. In particu-
lar, we focus on policy measures requiring simultaneous fiscal and
monetary expansionary stimuli based on tax cuts directly financed
by the central bank to check whether they are effective in restoring
full employment in our model economy.5 By operating a reduction
of the tax rate and maintaining unchanged both the government’s
budget deficit and, by means of a monetary expansion, aggregate
demand, our analysis suggests that the stationary long-run em-
ployment level increases monotonically with the decrease in the
tax rate. This confirms the efficacy of such policies that, provided
they are of the right magnitude, should be capable to restore full
employment.6
5Similar policies have been implemented by the Bank of Japan, which has
adopted a policy of quantitative monetary easing since 2001. Policies equiva-
lent to those outlined in the paper have also been advocated by Ben Bernanke
(see The Economist, June 21st, 2003).
6These policies have been called for by many economists (see e.g Auer-
bach and Obstfeld, 2005) and lie at the heart of the so-called ‘Abenomics’,
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Finally, the paper also provides a setup to investigate the role
of consumers’ expectations in economies experiencing prolonged
recessions. In a series of influential policy papers and editorials of
the end of the 1990s, investigating the liquidity trap situation of
the Japanese economy, Paul Krugman advocated the importance
of creating inflationary expectations to escape the recession.7 We
discuss under what conditions such a ‘policy’ works in our frame-
work, and study the relationships between expectations and the
degree of wage and price stickiness/flexibility characterizing the
economy. In particular, we show that after a restrictive monetary
shock leading to a deflationary recession, and provided the latter
is not too deep, the economy can recover to full employment if
consumers can be convinced to hold inflationary expectations. By
expecting inflation for the next period and being able to store the
consumption good so that they can consume part of it in their
second period of life, consumers have an incentive to demand all
their desired life-time consumption when young, which boosts ag-
gregate demand potentially allowing the economy to get out of the
recession.
It is essential to note, however, that the degree of wage stick-
iness matters for the ability of the economy to recover from a
recession through inflationary expectations. For sufficiently high
downward flexibility of the nominal wage, in fact, the increase
in aggregate demand determined by the anticipated purchases in-
duced by inflationary expectations is not enough to lead the econ-
omy out of the recession, and expectations quickly return from in-
flationary to deflationary. On the contrary, for low values of wage
flexibility, inflationary expectations suffice to restore full employ-
ment. Finally, for intermediate values of downward nominal wage
flexibility, multiplicity of equilibria with self-confirming (deflation-
ary or inflationary) expectations will emerge. This suggests that,
which places a large emphasis on quantitative easing to alleviate deflationary
pressures.
7Most of Krugman’s papers on this subject have been collected in a special
page on Japan of Krugman’s website at http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/.
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in the case in which inflationary expectations are not sufficient to
overcome the recession, imposing downward rigidity of wages is an
effective measure to restore full employment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents the behavior of consumers, producers and the govern-
ment, and it discusses the timing of the model. Section 3 defines
the temporary equilibrium with stochastic rationing of the econ-
omy and proves the existence and uniqueness of such an equilib-
rium. In Section 4 we set up the dynamic system, illustrating
the behavior of the state variables, and the adjustment processes
of prices and wages. We also introduce the possibility of expec-
tations switching in order to keep expectations correct along a
trajectory of the system. Section 5 presents numerical simulations
of the behavior of the economy and illustrates the consequences
of a restrictive monetary shock for different degrees of wage and
price stickiness, while Section 6 asserts the local stability of the
quasi-stationary recessionary and inflationary equilibria, as well
as the instability of Walrasian equilibrium. Section 7 investigates
the effectiveness of alternative economic policies to recover from a
deflationary recession, focusing on the case of an economy in a liq-
uidity trap situation (such as that experienced by Japan for more
than two decades by now), for which traditional fiscal or monetary
policies are difficult to implement. In particular, we explore the
potential of both expansionary fiscal and monetary policies and
of policies based on the creation of inflationary expectations, as
well as the effects of changes in the degree of wage stickiness or
flexibility. Section 8 concludes and two appendices contain more
technical material.
2 The Model
We consider an economy in which there are n OLG-consumers,
n′ firms and a government. Consumers offer labor inelastically
when young and consume a composite consumption good in both
periods. That good is produced by firms using an atemporal pro-
10
duction function whose only input is labor. The government levies
a proportional tax on firms’ profits to finance its expenditure for
goods. Nevertheless, budget deficits and surpluses may arise and
are made possible through money creation or destruction.
2.1 Timing of the Model
In period t − 1 producers obtain an aggregate profit of Πt−1,
which is distributed at the beginning of period t in part as tax
to the government (taxΠt−1) and in part to young consumers
((1− tax)Πt−1), where 0 ≤ tax ≤ 1.8 Also at the beginning of pe-
riod t old consumers hold a total quantity of money Mt, consisting
of savings generated in period t − 1. Thus households use money
as a means of transfer of purchasing power between periods.
Let Xt denote the aggregate quantity of the good purchased
by young consumers in period t, pt its price, wt the nominal wage
and Lt the aggregate quantity of labor. Then
Mt+1 = (1− tax)Πt−1 + wtLt − ptXt.
Denoting with G the quantity of goods purchased by the govern-
ment and taking into account that old households want to con-
sume all their money holdings in period t, the aggregate con-
sumption of young and old households and of the government
is Yt = Xt + Mt/pt + G. Using that Πt = ptYt − wtLt, consid-
ering Πt − Πt−1 = ΔMPt as the variation in the money stock
held by producers before they distribute profits and denoting with
ΔMCt = Mt+1 −Mt the one referring to consumers, we obtain a
standard accounting identity, i.e. ΔMCt +ΔM
P
t = ptG− taxΠt−1,
the latter being the budget deficit.
Denoting with St the aggregate amount of inventories carried
over by firms to period t and with Y pt the aggregate amount of
goods produced in period t, there results St+1 = Y
p
t + St − Yt.
8This assumption can be seen as encoding the idea that consumers are
dynasties who own the technology. Young consumers collect the profits and
when old give the property rights to the next generation.
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2.2 The Consumption Sector
Young consumers are endowed with s units of labor and an amount
of money (1− tax)Πt−1/n. Preferences will be described by an
expected utility function derived from the instantaneous utility
function u (xt, xt+1) = x
h
t x
1−h
t+1 , 0 < h < 1, where x denotes con-
sumption.9 In solving its decision problem the young household
has to decide whether to buy the quantities xt and xt+1 in periods
t and t + 1, respectively, or buy the total quantity xt + xt+1 in
period t and transfer (costlessly) xt+1 to period t + 1. This in
turn depends on the value of θet ≡ pet+1/pt where the superscript e
stands for expectation. If θet < 1, the consumer expects a decrease
in the goods price and hence prefers to buy xt+1 in his second
period of life. In the opposite case θet > 1 he buys everything in
his first period.
Consider first the case θet < 1. We assume that the labor mar-
ket is visited before the goods market and that young consumers
may be rationed on the labor market, according to a 0−1 rationing
mechanism. Then they face the budget constraints
0 ≤ xt ≤ ωit, 0 ≤ xt+1 ≤
(
ωit − xt
)
/θet , i = 0, 1,
where
ω0t =
1− tax
pt
Πt−1
n
and ω1t = ω
0
t +
wt
pt
s
are a consumer’s real wealth when he is unemployed and employed,
respectively.
A young consumer may be rationed, again according to a 0−1
rule, also on the goods market.10 The expected value of con-
sumption is γdt x
d
t , where the rationing coefficient γ
d
t ∈ [0, 1] is
the probability that he can buy his quantity demanded xdt . It
is perceived as given by the consumer but will be determined in
equilibrium. From these assumptions follows that expected utility
9See Colombo and Weinrich (2003) for a more general approach to the
consumer’s problem.
10The 0-1 rule is for simplicity only. For a more general formulation see
Colombo and Weinrich (2003).
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is γdt x
h
t
((
ωit − xt
)
/θet
)1−h
the maximization of which yields the
effective demand xdit equal to hω
i
t, which obviously depends on
the real income ωit, and hence on whether the consumer has been
employed, but it is independent of γdt and θ
e
t .
11
Consider now the case θet > 1. Then a young consumer wants
to buy the total quantity xt + xt+1 ≡ x̂t in his first period of life
and thus has to meet the budget constraint
xt + xt+1 ≤ ωit , i = 0, 1.
Monotonicity of the utility function implies that his effective de-
mand is x̂dit = ω
i
t.
Denote with λst = min
{
Ldt /L
s, 1
}
the fraction of young con-
sumers that will be employed, where Ldt denotes aggregate demand
of labor and Ls = ns aggregate supply. Then the aggregate de-
mand of goods by young consumers in case of deflationary expec-
tations θet < 1 is
Xdt ≡ λstnxd1t + (1− λst )nxd0t
= h
[
(1− tax) Πt−1
pt
+
wt
pt
λstL
s
]
≡ Xd
(
λst ;
wt
pt
,
(1− tax)Πt−1
pt
, h
)
(1)
whereas in case of inflationary expectations θet > 1 it is
X̂dt ≡ λstnx̂d1t + (1− λst )nx̂d0t
= (1− tax) Πt−1
pt
+
wt
pt
λstL
s
= Xd
(
λst ;
wt
pt
,
(1− tax)Πt−1
pt
, 1
)
. (2)
From (1) and (2) it is evident that the only difference in the ag-
gregate effective demand by young consumers implied by different
11Note that the function to be maximized is of the Cobb-Douglas type for
which it is standard to see that it yields the maximizer given in the text.
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expectations θet smaller or larger than 1 lies in the multiplicative
factor τ ∈ {h, 1}. We shall therefore identify the value of τ with
the corresponding expectation type.
The total effective aggregate demand of the consumption sector
is now obtained by adding old consumers’ aggregate demand mt =
Mt/pt and government demand G:
Y dt ≡ Xd (λst ;αt, (1− tax)πt, τ) +mt +G,
where αt ≡ wt/pt and πt ≡ Πt−1/pt.
2.3 The Production Sector
All firms are identical and produce according to the same produc-
tion function ypt = f (t) = a
b
t , a, b > 0. Denoting with st the
inventories held at the beginning of period t, the total amount
supplied by a firm is yst = y
p
t + st. Firms too may be rationed
both on the goods and on the labor market by means of rationing
mechanisms similar to those assumed for the consumption sector.
For the labor market we assume again 0−1 rationing and thus,
letting dt be the single firm’s effective demand of labor and denot-
ing with λdt ∈ [0, 1] the probability that the firm is not rationed
on the labor market, it follows that Et = λ
d
t 
d
t . On the goods
market the rationing rule is assumed to be
cyt =
{
yst , with prob. σγ
s
t
dty
s
t , with prob. 1− σγst
where σ ∈ (0, 1) , γst ∈ [0, 1], dt = (γst − σγst ) / (1− σγst ), and
yst = f
(
dt
)
+ st denotes the firm’s effective supply. σ is a fixed
parameter of the mechanism, whereas λdt and γ
s
t are perceived ra-
tioning coefficients taken as given by the firm the value of which
will be determined in equilibrium. The definition of dt implies
that Eyt = γ
s
t y
s
t , which is independent of σ.
Note that there is an upper bound on a firm’s effective labor
demand since the firm must be prepared to finance labor purchases
even when rationed on the goods market (the labor market is in
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fact visited first, so that rationing on the goods market is observed
only after labor has been hired). Formally:
0 ≤ dt ≤
dt
αt
[
f
(
dt
)
+ st
]
. (3)
Each firm’s effective labor demand dt = 
d (γst ;αt) is obtained by
maximizing expected profits, γst
[
f
(
dt
)
+ st
]−αtdt , subject to (3).
In general, the solution to this problem depends on the constraint
(3), but the latter is not binding if b ≤ 1 − σ (see Appendix 1,
Lemma A.1). Under this assumption, we obtain
dt = 
d (γst ;αt) =
(
γst ab
αt
) 1
1−b
. (4)
Notice that labor demand is independent of st because the lat-
ter enters in an additive way into the firm’s objective function.
This does not mean that st is irrelevant; rather, as will be seen,
the aggregate value of inventories, St, influences the firm’s de-
cision in an indirect way by affecting the (equilibrium) value of
the rationing coefficient γst . The aggregate labor demand then is
Ldt = n
′d (γst ;αt) ≡ Ld (γst ;αt) and, because only a fraction λdt of
firms can hire workers, the aggregate supply of goods is
Y st = λ
d
tn
′f
(
d (γst ;αt)
)
+ St ≡ Y s
(
λdt , γ
s
t ;αt, St
)
. (5)
3 Temporary Equilibrium Allocations
For any t, a temporary equilibrium with rationing is described by
the following
Definition 1. Given a real wage αt, a real profit level πt, real
money balances mt, inventories St, a level of public expenditure
G, a tax rate tax and an expectation type τ ∈ {h, 1}, a list of ra-
tioning coefficients
(
γdt , γ
s
t , λ
d
t , λ
s
t , δt, εt
) ∈ [0, 1]6 and an aggregate
allocation
(
Lt, Y t
)
constitute a temporary equilibrium if the fol-
lowing conditions are fulfilled:
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(C1) Lt = λ
s
tL
s = λdtL
d (γst ;αt) ;
(C2) Y t = γ
s
t Y
s
(
λdt , γ
s
t ;αt, St
)
= γdtX
d (λst ;αt, (1− tax)πt, τ) + δtmt + εtG;
(C3) (1− λst )
(
1− λdt
)
= 0; (1− γst )
(
1− γdt
)
= 0;
(C4) γdt (1− δt) = 0; δt (1− εt) = 0.
Conditions (C1) and (C2) require that agents correctly perceive
the rationing coefficients γdt , γ
s
t , λ
d
t and λ
s
t so that the expected
aggregate transactions balance. In addition, condition (C3) for-
malizes the short-side rule guaranteeing that at most one side on
each market is rationed. Finally, since also old households and/or
the government can be rationed (with rationing coefficients δt and
εt), conditions (C2) and (C4) take care of this but require it to
happen only after young households have been rationed to zero.
Furthermore, the government can be rationed only if both young
and old consumers are rationed to zero.
Definition 1 allows to distinguish different types of equilibrium
according to which market sides are rationed: excess supply on
both markets (λst < 1, γ
s
t < 1) is called Keynesian Unemployment
[K], excess demand on both markets (λdt < 1, γ
s
t < 1) Repressed
Inflation [I], excess supply on the labor market (λst < 1) and excess
demand on the goods market (γdt < 1) Classical Unemployment
[C], and excess demand on the labor market (λdt < 1) with excess
supply on the goods market (γdt < 1) Underconsumption [U ]. Of
course, there are further intermediate cases which, however, can
be considered as limiting cases of the above ones. In particular,
when all the rationing coefficients are equal to one, we are in a
Walrasian Equilibrium.
The following proposition establishes the existence and unique-
ness of temporary equilibrium.
Proposition 1. For any list of variables (αt,mt, πt, St), with αt
strictly positive and mt, πt and St non-negative, any non-negative
pair of policy parameters (G, tax) and any expectation type τ ∈
{h, 1} , there exists a unique temporary equilibrium allocation (Lt, Y t).
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Lt is given by
Lt = min
{
L˜ (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ) , L
d (1, αt) , L
s
}
≡ L (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ) (6)
where L˜ (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ) is the unique solution in L of
αt
(
1
b
− τ
)
L+
αt
ab
(
L
n′
)1−b
St = τ (1− tax)πt +mt +G (7)
and
Ld (1, αt) = n
′
(
ab
αt
) 1
1−b
. (8)
Y t ≡ Y (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ) is determined as follows. If Lt =
L˜ (·), then Y t = αtb Lt + αtab
(
Lt
n′
)1−b
St, and if Lt = L
d (1, αt),
then Y t =
αt
b L
d (1, αt) + St. Finally, if Lt = L
s, then Y t =
min
{
αt
b L
s + St, τ (1− tax)πt + ταtLs +mt +G
}
.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
For the sake of illustration, let us consider a situation of Keynesian
Unemployment in which τ = h. This type of equilibrium involves
rationing of households on the labor market and of firms on the
goods market. It is given by a pair (λst , γ
s
t ) such that
Lt = λ
s
tL
s = Ld (γst )
Y t = γ
s
t Y
s (1, γst ) = X
d (λst ) +mt +G
where we have suppressed all arguments that are not rationing
coefficients.
The consumption sector supplies the amount of labor Ls > Lt
and demands the quantity of goods Y dt = Y t, whereas firms de-
mand labor Ldt = Lt and supply Y
s
t > Y t of goods. It follows
that λst = Lt/L
s, γst = Y t/Y
s
t and λ
d
t = γ
d
t = 1 (= δt = εt) ,
which are just the values that lead households and firms to ex-
press their respective transaction offers. Thus their expectations
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regarding these rationing coefficients are confirmed. Neverthe-
less, due to the randomness in rationing at an individual agent’s
level, effective aggregate demands and supplies of rationed agents
exceed their actual transactions. Moreover, as indicated earlier,
these excesses can be used to get an indicator of the strength
of rationing. Since there is zero-one rationing on the labor mar-
ket, 1 − λst = (Ls − Lt)/Ls is the unemployment rate. On the
goods market, in a K-equilibrium we have Y t − γst Y s (1, γst ) = 0
and, since ∂Y s/∂γst = n
′f ′
(
d (γst )
)
dd
dγst
> 0, a decrease in Y t, for
example due to a reduction in government spending, implies a de-
crease in γst , i.e. an increase in 1−γst . Thus, an aggravation of the
shortage of aggregate demand for firms’ goods is unambiguously
related to an increase in 1−γst which can therefore be interpreted
as a measure of the strength of rationing on the goods market.
A similar reasoning justifies the use as rationing measures of the
terms 1− λdt and 1− γdt in the other equilibrium regimes.
4 Dynamics
The link between successive periods is given by the adjustment of
prices, by the changes in the stock of money and in profits, and by
possible changes in the expectation type. The latter is a somewhat
subtle issue that we will treat as the last point in our description
of the dynamics. Initially, we assume a given expectation type
τ ∈ {h, 1} and proceed as if this type were constant. Later we will
introduce the possibility of expectation switching.
For given τ , the adjustment of prices and wages is such that
the price rises (falls) whenever an excess of demand (supply) is
observed. Hence, in terms of the rationing coefficients observed in
period t, we have that
pt+1 < pt ⇔ γst < 1, pt+1 > pt ⇔ γdt < 1,
wt+1 < wt ⇔ λst < 1, wt+1 > wt ⇔ λdt < 1.
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More precisely, our simulations are based on the following adjust-
ment mechanisms:
pt+1 =
{
[1− μ1 (1− γst )] pt if γst ≤ 1[
1 + μ2
(
1− γdt +δt+εt3
)]
pt if γ
d
t ≤ 1
(9)
wt+1 =
{
[1− ν1 (1− λst )]wt if λst ≤ 1[
1 + ν2
(
1− λdt
)]
wt if λ
d
t ≤ 1 (10)
where μ1, μ2, ν1, ν2 ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as the degree of
flexibility of adjustment. The dynamics of the real wage is then
described by the following equations:
αt+1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1−ν1(1−λst )
1−μ1(1−γst )αt if
(
Lt, Y t
) ∈ K
1−ν1(1−λst )
1+μ2
(
1− γ
d
t +δt+εt
3
)αt if (Lt, Y t) ∈ C
1+ν2(1−λdt )
1+μ2
(
1− γ
d
t +δt+εt
3
)αt if (Lt, Y t) ∈ I
1+ν2(1−λdt )
1−μ1(1−γst )αt
if
(
Lt, Y t
) ∈ U
(11)
whereas the inflation factor θt = pt+1/pt is given by
θt =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
1− μ1 (1− γst ) if
(
Lt, Y t
) ∈ K ∪ U
1 + μ2
(
1− γdt +δt+εt3
)
if
(
Lt, Y t
) ∈ C ∪ I . (12)
The dynamics of profits, money and inventories follow from the
definition of these variables and equations (5)-(8) and (11)-(12),
i.e.
πt+1 =
Y t − αtLt
θt
,
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mt+1 =
Mt+1
pt+1
=
1
pt+1
[
(1− tax)Πt−1 + wtLt − ptY t + δtMt + εtptG
]
=
1
θt
[
(1− tax)πt + αtLt − Y t + δtmt + εtG
]
=
1
θt
[δtmt + εtG+ (1− tax)πt]− πt+1
and
St+1 = Y
s
(
λdt , γ
s
t ;αt, St
)
− Y t = λdtn′a
(
γst ab
αt
) b
1−b
+ St − Y t ,
where
Y t = Y (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ) and Lt = L (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ) .
It then follows that the dynamics of the model is given by the
sequence {(αt,mt, πt, St)}∞t=1. The values of the rationing coeffi-
cients
(
γdt , γ
s
t , λ
d
t , λ
s
t , δt, εt
)
are determined in Appendix 2 where
the corresponding explicit equations of the complete dynamic sys-
tem are also stated.
We introduce now the possibility of expectation switching. We
would like this to occur whenever it is required in order to keep ex-
pectations correct along a trajectory of the system.12 For example,
consider the case that, in period t, consumers have deflationary ex-
pectations (θet ≤ 1 or, equivalently, τ = h) but the equilibrium in
period t is such that there is excess demand on the goods market
and thus pt+1 > pt. Then the assumption τ = h in period t has
been incorrect and we substitute it by τ = 1, i.e. θet > 1. Of course
then a different equilibrium arises in period t but we claim that
the type of equilibrium is still such that there is excess demand on
12Although we are not going to model the process of how expectations are
effectively generated, we can think of a scenario in which a central forecasting
institute be able to predict correctly whether in the next period there will be
inflation or deflation.
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the goods market. Therefore expectations have been adjusted so
as to become correct. Analogously we correct the expectations in
case θet > 1 but the equilibrium in period t involves excess supply
on the goods market. The rationale for doing this is given by the
following
Lemma 1. Assume that for τ = h in period t an equilibrium with
γdt < 1 occurs. Then this inequality is preserved when switching in
period t to τ = 1. Conversely, assume that for τ = 1 in period t an
equilibrium with γst < 1 occurs. Then this inequality is preserved
when switching in period t to τ = h.
Proof: Assume that τ = h in period t and that in the correspond-
ing equilibrium we have γdt < 1. Then there is excess demand on
the goods market, i.e. Y dt = X
d
t +mt + G > Y
s
t . If τ is changed
to τ = 1, then by (1) and (2) Xdt increases. Thus the excess of
demand over supply on the goods market can only increase and in
particular Y dt > Y
s
t still holds.
Conversely, consider τ = 1 in period t and γst < 1. Then
Y dt < Y
s
t and changing τ from 1 to h decreases X
d
t , thus Y
d
t , and
Y dt < Y
s
t is preserved. 
Taking into account expectations switching, a trajectory of the
dynamic system is now given by a sequence {(αt,mt, πt, St, τt)}∞t=1.
Note that these state variables are perfectly foreseen by economic
agents in any period t. This is a remarkable property of the model
as the dynamic system it gives rise to is a truly forward looking
one.13
13In most cases of dynamic systems in economics, they are given by a sys-
tem of implicit difference equations, in which case an explicit solution in the
sense of a (local) flow of mappings cannot be computed analytically; see e.g.
Grandmont (1985), Grandmont and Laroque (1986), or Chiappori and Gues-
nerie (1991). On the other hand, models that avoid this problem - giving rise
to truly forward looking dynamic systems - typically are not compatible with
perfect foresight outside the stationary state. For a systematic discussion of
this issue see e.g. Bo¨hm and Wenzelburger (1999).
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5 Simulations
The non-linear dynamic system describing our economy is five-
dimensional, with state variables αt,mt, πt, St and τt. Moreover,
since there are four equilibrium regimes, it can be viewed as being
composed of four subsystems each of which may become effective
through endogenous regime switching. It is therefore necessary to
resort to numerical simulations in order to study the dynamics of
our economy.14
The basic parameter set specifies values for the technological
coefficients (a and b), the exponent of the utility function (h),
the labor supply (Ls) and the total number of producers in the
economy (n′), the price adjustment speeds downward and upward
(respectively μ1 and μ2), and the corresponding wage adjustment
speeds (ν1 and ν2). It further assumes initial values for the state
variables (α0,m0, π0, S0 and τ0) and for the price level (p0), and
values for the government policy parameters (G and tax). Having
chosen p0, the goods price level pt for any t – and consequently
wt = αtpt and Mt = mtpt – is determined by means of (9).
Letting a = 1, b = 0.85, h = 0.5, Ls = 100 and n′ = 100, a
stationary Walrasian equilibrium is obtained for
α∗ = 0.85, m∗ = 46.25, π∗ = 15, S∗ = 0,
G∗ = 7.5, tax∗ = 0.5, τ∗ = h, (13)
with trading levels L∗ = Y ∗ = 100.15 Out of Walrasian equi-
librium we will vary the downward (upward) adjustment speeds
of wages ν1 (ν2), while we will stick to μ1 = μ2 = 0.1 for the
adjustment speeds of prices.
In our numerical simulations we will focus on the consequences
of a restrictive monetary shock determining a reduction in the ini-
14Our numerical simulations are based on the package MACRODYN that has
been developed by Volker Bo¨hm at the University of Bielefeld.
15Note that there is a second Walrasian equilibrium in which τ∗ = 1, m∗ = 0
and all other values are those given in (13). That equilibrium is equivalent to
the one with τ∗ = h and m∗ = 46.25 in the sense that both equilibria give rise
to the same utility of consumers (46.25).
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tial money stock to m0 = 40, keeping all other parameters and
initial values at their Walrasian levels.16 Since m0 is the demand
of old agents at time t = 0, aggregate demand is reduced, which
implies excess supply on the goods market (and a reduction in the
goods price). As a consequence, firms reduce their labor demand,
which in turn implies excess supply also on the labor market, and
the economy enters in a state of Keynesian unemployment. If the
wage rate falls more than the goods price, the real wage decreases,
and it may converge to a limit level below the Walrasian real wage.
A lower real wage determines a reduction in the labor income of
workers and therefore in the aggregate goods demand, keeping
employment below full employment. In this case, the restrictive
monetary shock causes a permanent decrease in employment and
output. Due to the falling government spending in nominal terms,
the government is permanently realizing a budget surplus (i.e.
ΔM = ptG − taxΠt−1 < 0) and therefore the nominal money
stock shrinks. Figure 1, which shows time series for ν1 = 0.025
and ν2 = 0.1, illustrates the convergence of the dynamic system to
a quasi-stationary Keynesian state with permanent deflation of all
nominal variables but constant real magnitudes. The restrictive
monetary shock has caused a permanent decrease in employment
and output.
16This monetary shock should be considered a proxy for a more realistic
monetary policy.
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Inventories are decisive here as their presence amplifies the
fall of labor demand by firms, further depressing real labor in-
come and aggregate demand. In fact, when aggregate demand is
diminished due to a decrease in m0, inventories become positive
and rise further as excess supply on the goods market builds up.
As γs = Y t/Y
s
(
λdt , γ
s
t ;αt, St
)
by (C2) of Definition 1 and St in-
fluences Y s positively by (5), an increase in St reduces the sales
expectation ratio γs which by (4) diminishes the labor demand
more than would be the case without inventories.17
Finally, it is natural to ask whether different degrees of down-
ward wage flexibility give rise to convergence to a full employment
equilibrium or, on the contrary, to an even deeper recession. It
turns out that this depends indeed on that degree, as shown in
the bifurcation diagram of Figure 2.
All other things equal, approximately until ν1 = 0.018 the
economy returns to full employment after the monetary shock,
whereas for speeds of wage adjustment larger than this it gets
trapped in underemployment.
6 Stability
The fact that a restrictive monetary shock may lead to a quasi-
stationary Keynesian Unemployment state as limit of the dynamic
system’s trajectory raises the wider question of the stability of
such a state. Analogously, the stability of the stationary Wal-
rasian equilibrium or of a possible quasi-stationary inflationary
state may be investigated.18 To anticipate the answer, numeri-
17Indeed, when not allowing for inventories as in Colombo and Weinrich
(2003) and in Bignami, Colombo and Weinrich (2004), the implications of a
monetary shock change entirely, with the economy returning to the Walrasian
equilibrium. The real wage decreases initially but then the decrease in the
goods price dominates the one in the nominal wage, and the real wage moves
back to its Walrasian level, as do all the other variables.
18It is straightforward to see from equations (9) and (10) that there can
never exist quasi-stationary states in the Classical Unemployment and the
Underconsumption regimes.
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Figure 2: Stationary employment values when m0 = 40.
cal simulations suggest that the Walrasian equilibrium is unsta-
ble whereas the Keynesian Unemployment state and the quasi-
stationary Repressed Inflation state (the existence of which will
be shown below) are locally stable.
Let us first look at the quasi-stationary Keynesian state. The
limit values of the state variables of the simulation shown in Fig-
ure 1, where we have an initial reduction of the money stock to
m0 = 40 at a downward wage flexibility of ν1 = 0.025 and policy
parameters G∗ = 7.5 and tax∗ = 0.5, are (approximately)
α = 0.8281, m = 31.9263, π = 15.7889, S = 6.4060, τ = 0.5,
(14)
with a stationary employment level L = 66.9342. We now take
these stationary values as new initial values, i.e. set (α0,m0, π0, S0, τ0)
= (α,m, π, S, τ), and perform a bifurcation analysis with respect
to each of the state variables around these initial values and de-
pendent variable the employment level L. The results are shown
26
in Figure 3.
The diagrams show that local deviations in any of the state
variables do not change the fact that the system has this state as
an attracting long-run rest point. Although this is not a strict
proof of local stability, it is highly indicative of the dynamic sys-
tem’s behavior. Moreover, in order to return from the stationary
recessionary state to permanent full employment by changing only
the money stock, an increase in that variable to its Walrasian value
(46.25) is not sufficient, but a higher increase, to approximately
51, would be needed. The case is still worse for a unilateral vari-
ation of real profits which would have to be more than tripled,
to around 52, to get permanently out of unemployment. In both
cases the reason is intuitively clear: only a substantial increase in
the purchasing power of consumers, old or young, can succeed to
change the situation of insufficient aggregate demand causing Key-
nesian Unemployment. A detailed analysis of the respective time
series shows that, after an initial shock to m0 > 51 or π0 > 52, the
system enters in the regime of Repressed Inflation where it con-
verges to a full employment state which, as will be shown below,
will be quasi-stationary.
The panel of Figure 3 showing the bifurcation diagram over
inventories indicates that no change in the initial value of S is
by itself sufficient to overcome the recessionary state. Even a
temporary decrease of inventories to zero is not capable to lead
the dynamic system out of the Keynesian Unemployment regime
because the insufficient demand quickly builds up inventories again
and restores the old situation.
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A less immediate intuition is available for the effects of a change
in the initial value of the real wage α. An increase of its value from
the stationary state value typically results in a state of Classical
Unemployment, because the high real wage not only creates ex-
cess demand on the goods market but also excess supply on the
labor market. This implies a decrease in the nominal wage, an in-
crease in the goods price and a decrease in the real wage. On the
one hand, this decreases the income of employed workers, on the
other hand it increases labor demand and thus the number of em-
ployed workers. Hence from Classical unemployment the economy
may move to Keynesian Unemployment or to Repressed Inflation.
What it does depends on how large the initial increase in the real
wage is. If it is not very large (α0 less than 0.901), the first of the
above effects prevails and the system returns into the Keynesian
regime. There inventories are built up and the system converges
to the quasi-stationary Keynesian state. Conversely, if the initial
increase in the real wage was large enough (α0 > 0.901), it is the
second effect that prevails – aggregate demand increases – and the
economy enters into the inflationary regime where it converges to
an inflationary quasi-stationary state. On the other hand, a de-
crease of α0 from α typically leads the dynamic system to enter
into the regime of Repressed Inflation. From there it may return
to the Keynesian regime (for values of α0 above 0.547) or over-
shoot and converge to an inflationary state (for α0 smaller than
0.547), which is characterized below.19
Let us now look at the Walrasian stationary equilibrium given
by the values in (13). Setting (α0,m0, π0, S0, τ0) = (α
∗,m∗, π∗, S∗, τ∗)
and performing bifurcation analyses analogous to the ones done
above yields Figure 4. From this it can be seen that the Walrasian
state is unstable in three of the four directions defined by the state
variables, namely m, π and S. Only in direction α is the system
19Note that a variation of τ from h to 1 would not be a local variation because
any local variation is characterized by τ ∈ (h− ε, h+ ε) ∩Dτ for some ε > 0,
where Dτ denotes the domain of τ . But (h− ε, h+ ε) ∩Dτ = {h} , and thus
the system is (trivially) locally stable with respect to τ .
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locally stable. Whenever m0 < m
∗, π0 < π∗ or S0 > S∗, the
dynamic system diverges from the Walrasian state and converges
to the quasi-stationary Keynesian unemployment state considered
above with L = 66.9342. Thus the Walrasian equilibrium is locally
unstable.20
Finally, by proceeding in an analogous way as for the Keyne-
sian regime, but assuming an expansionary monetary shock, we
can characterize a quasi-stationary Repressed Inflation state by
the following values of the state variables:
α = 0.8482, m = 3.8432, π = 14.9478, S = 0, τ = 1, (15)
with a stationary inflation rate φt = 0.138992, where φt is defined
as the percentage price inflation φt = 100 (pt+1 − pt) /pt. Taking
as before these values as the initial ones, Figure 5 shows bifurca-
tion analyses with respect to each of the state variables around
them. From these it appears that this state is locally stable.21
Note that the above results are obtained for specific parameter
values. One particularly significant parameter here is the down-
ward wage flexibility ν1. In the present simulations this value has
been set to 0.025, but similar results hold whenever ν1 is above
the benchmark value seen in Figure 2 (approximately 0.018) that
separates the stationary values of employment from full to below
full employment.
20Note that the fact that the Walrasian equilibrium is locally unstable does
not mean that there does not exist a subset of the parameter set such that,
starting from a point in that subset, the dynamic system converges to it.
21Observe that the above stationary values are very close to those corre-
sponding to the Walrasian equilibrium with τ∗ = 1 indicated in Footnote 11.
Moreover, it can be shown that consumers’ utility in this inflationary state is
the same as that in the Walrasian equilibrium (46.25) while the utility corre-
sponding to the quasi-stationary Keynesian equilibrium is significantly smaller
(31.66).
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7 Policy
When an economy is stuck in a deflationary recession, a natural
question to ask is how to get out of it. That this is not automatic
has been put in evidence at least twice, during the Great De-
pression and more recently in the case of the Japanese economy.
Its performance since the early 1990s with prolonged recession,
unemployment, overcapacity/excess inventories and falling prices
and nominal wages fits into our scenario of a quasi-stationary state
with Keynesian unemployment. Thus, we are challenged to apply
the insights from our theoretical model to the Japanese case.
There is a variety of reasons why Japan has been in trouble for
so long. On the one hand it is argued that Japan’s deflation has
been largely structural and that the money-transmission system
has not been working because banks, saddled with bad loans, have
not been able to lend more than they actually did. So the priority
was initially to fix the banking system, and indeed several reforms
affecting financial markets have been implemented in recent years.
More recently, other structural reforms, most importantly a liber-
alization of the labor market, have been envisaged. On the other
hand, an important role can be played by standard Keynesian
economic policies such as expansionary fiscal and monetary mea-
sures, the implementation of which is however difficult due to a
very large debt (240% of GDP in 2014) and a nominal interest
rate of zero since September 2010. Nevertheless, as we shall show
below, a joint fiscal/monetary policy that reduces taxes and gov-
ernment spending and compensates the loss in tax revenue of the
government by the Bank of Japan financing it can be devised and
appears to be working. Furthermore, additional policies can be
implemented by exploiting other standard Keynesian arguments,
such as the introduction of downward nominal wage rigidities, or
the creation of inflationary expectations. We shall explore these
policies as well in the following subsections.
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7.1 Fiscal and monetary policies
A standard Keynesian argument is that a fiscal stimulus can boost
demand when an economy is in a liquidity trap. Japan’s public
debt appears, however, to be too big already and thus to finance
a fiscal stimulus in a conventional way does not seem possible.
An alternative approach is to adopt quantitative easing. In fact,
already in 2003 Ben Bernanke had suggested that the government
enact tax cuts and the Bank of Japan finance them directly, paying
for the forgone tax revenue to the government, so that the debt
burden does not change.22
In the framework of our model we can emulate such a policy
by reducing the tax rate from tax∗ = 0.5 to a new value tax so
that the income of (young) consumers out of profit after taxation
is
(1− tax)π = (1− tax∗)π +Δm,
with
Δm = (tax∗ − tax)π.
Moreover, if the central bank pays for the reduction in consumers’
taxes, the government’s tax income is (as before)
tax · π +Δm = tax∗ · π.
The government’s budget deficit in real terms can then be written
as
G∗ − tax∗ · π = G∗ − tax · π −Δm = (G∗ −Δm)− tax · π.
This is equivalent to a simultaneous balanced reduction in govern-
ment spending to G = G∗ −Δm and in taxes.
22In this way the “Bank of Japan would mitigate the usual concerns about
rising debt: debt purchases by the central bank rather than the private sec-
tor implies no net increase in debt service and hence no future tax increases.
Consumers should then be more willing to spend rather than save any tax
cut. It also gets around the Bank of Japan’s concern about the blocked
money-transmission mechanism: a joint monetary and fiscal boost will in-
crease spending regardless of the health of banks” (The Economist, June 21st
2003, p. 74).
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What happens to the dynamic performance of the economy
when the measure (G, tax) is imposed? Starting from the quasi-
stationary Keynesian unemployment state (α,m, π, S, τ) given by
(14) and setting government spending toG = tax·π∗, with π∗ = 15
being the Walrasian value of real profits, so that the government’s
budget is balanced at the Walrasian equilibrium, the result is dis-
played in Figure 6. The figure shows that a reduction in the tax
rate monotonically increases the long-run stationary locally stable
value of employment. Moreover, at a value of tax approximately
equal to 0.17, full employment is reached. Note that the horizon-
tal lines in Figure 6 refer to the stationary employment values for
tax ≤ 0.17 and tax = 0.2, 0.3, ..., 1.
Figure 6: Stationary locally stable values of employment depend-
ing on different balanced-budget tax quotas.
The above policy measure is well known as balanced-budget
fiscal policy, and textbook economics states that the corresponding
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balanced-budget multiplier is one. In particular, this would imply
that a reduction in the tax rate (and in government spending)
reduces output and hence employment. How is this compatible
with Figure 6? Note, first of all, that the textbook multiplier refers
to a static situation with prices and wages fixed whereas here we
have a dynamic analysis with flexible prices, wages and money
stock. To best understand what is going on, consider the two
extreme cases of (G, tax) = (0, 0) and (G, tax) = (15, 1). Looking
at the respective time series numbers, after one iteration we have
in the first case an employment level of L1 = 60.74 whereas in
the second case L1 = 73.14. Comparing with the initial level
L = 66.93 (stationary at (G, tax) = (G∗, tax∗) = (7.5, 0.5)) these
values fit quite well with the textbook prediction. Subsequently
Lt+1 > Lt in the case (G, tax) = (0, 0) and Lt+1 < Lt in the case
(G, tax) = (15, 1). The first time employment is larger in the first
case than in the second is in period 8 when L8 = 65.99 in case
(G, tax) = (0, 0) and L8 = 65.97 in case (G, tax) = (15, 1).
A further variable that helps to understand the dynamic be-
havior is the money stockm. In case (G, tax) = (0, 0), m increases
monotonically from 33.37 in the first period to its limit 50, while
in case (G, tax) = (15, 1) m decreases monotonically from 30.5 to
its limit 25.17. In the first case, the low (zero) tax enables young
households to save more and carry more real balances to the second
period of their life. This eventually increases aggregate demand
more than the fixed reduction in government spending decreases
it, thus increasing output and employment. The opposite is true
in the case of the high tax: the decrease in real money balances
eventually dominates the increase in government spending.
The above analysis suggests a balanced-budget tax reduction
as a remedy to recession in the long run. However, the fact that in
the short run employment falls below the already low stationary
initial level is all but welcome. To avoid this, a simultaneous
increase in the money stockm0 can be used. Specifically, setm0 =
m + G∗ − G, together with (α0, π0, S0) = (α, π, S). If (G, tax) =
(0, 0), thenm0 = 31.93+7.5 = 39.43 and L1 = 73.82. Similarly, for
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less extreme values like for example (G, tax) = (2.55, 0.17), m0 =
36.88 and L1 = 71.48. In both cases, subsequent employment
values increase monotonically to full employment. This shows that
the combined measure of tax reduction and expansive monetary
policy works well, also in the short run, in our model economy.
In the case of the Japanese economy, the Bernanke-type policy
measure outlined at the beginning of this section is similar to the
one just analyzed for our model economy. In fact, it consists of a
tax reduction that does not change the debt burden of the gov-
ernment because the central bank pays the forgone tax revenue to
the government. Thus more income is given to households increas-
ing aggregate demand without changing the government’s budget
deficit. This is quite like what we have done in our model econ-
omy, where we have chosen a balanced-budget policy (G, tax) with
tax < tax∗ accompanied by a monetary policy m0 = m+G∗ −G.
Figure 6 indicates, however, that the chosen tax reduction must be
large enough as too small a reduction will improve but not elim-
inate unemployment. For example in our model economy, with
(G, tax) = (3, 0.2) and m0 = 36.43, L1 = 71.07 and the long-run
stationary employment level is 93.59.
7.2 Expectations and downward nominal wage rigid-
ity
Expectations. In a series of papers and editorials of the end of
the 1990s focusing on the Japanese deflationary recession, Paul
Krugman argued that the best way to escape a liquidity trap
was through the generation of inflationary expectations (see, e.g.
Krugman, 1998).23 Although our paper does not offer insights on
how to create inflationary expectations in the first place, it allows
us to see whether they can help restoring full employment.
23There are several ways that could be imagined to create inflationary ex-
pectations. According to Krugman (1998), one way would be to apply a fiscal
expansion that should be sustained even as the economy begins to develop in-
flation. For another example, the Bank of Japan can devaluate the Yen buying
foreign currency, thereby increasing the prices of import goods.
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Starting from a deflationary recessionary stationary state
(α,m, π, S, τ) as the one depicted in Figure 1, we consider a change
in τ from τ = h to τ = 1, that is we set (α0,m0, π0, S0, τ0) =
(α,m, π, S, 1). This means that young consumers expect inflation
for the next period and thus demand all their planned life-time
consumption in the first period. This boosts aggregate demand
and thus has the potential to lead the economy out of the reces-
sion. The result is shown in Figure 7 for ν1 = 0.025 and ν2 = 0.1:
the economy returns immediately to full employment and the infla-
tionary expectations are confirmed. In fact, the percentage price
inflation φt is positive over a prolonged period of time which means
that the economy finds itself each period in a state of Repressed
Inflation.
Krugman’s recipe is thus confirmed in our setting. However,
our analysis also highlights that nominal wage (and price) rigidities
matter for the ability of inflationary expectations to restore full
employment allowing the economy to overcome a liquidity trap. In
particular, the situation illustrated above changes when a higher
downward flexibility of the wage rate is assumed. This is shown
in Figure 8 for ν1 = 0.06. The increase in aggregate demand due
to the anticipated purchase of the consumption good is not suffi-
cient to lead the economy out of recession, and expectations return
after one period from inflationary to deflationary. Inflationary ex-
pectations would need to be sustained over time in order for the
economy to recover from a deflationary recession.24
Recalling Figure 2, Figure 9 shows that expectations-formation
works until the benchmark value of approximately ν1 = 0.0525 is
reached. For 0.018 < ν1 < 0.0525 there is thus multiplicity of
equilibria with self-confirming expectations.
Downward nominal wage rigidity. Finally, an additional policy in-
24For example, in the policy papers mentioned above, Krugman advocates
an ‘irresponsible’ monetary policy – i.e. a monetary policy remaining expan-
sionary even when prices start rising – to sustain inflationary expectations
of sufficient persistence and magnitude to generate the needed inflation to
overcome a liquidity trap.
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tervention that could be used to get over a deflationary recession
is based on the ‘control’ of the downward adjustment of nomi-
nal wages. To see this, consider again a deflationary recessionary
quasi-stationary state (α,m, π, S, τ), but this time such a severe
recession that generating inflationary expectations alone is not suf-
ficient to exit from it. As we have seen in Figures 8 and 9, this
is for example true for the quasi-stationary state obtained after
the recessionary monetary shock when ν1 = 0.06, in which case(
α,m, π, S, τ
)
= (0.58, 12.59, 17.68, 25.73, 0.5), giving rise to the
stationary values
(
L, Y
)
= (26.29, 32.13). Now we take these val-
ues as new initial values, except that we change τ from τ = 0.5 to
τ0 = 1 and ν1 from 0.06 to ν1 = 0.
What happens is shown in Figure 10. At the beginning, the in-
flationary expectations fall back to deflationary ones as the effect
of a constant nominal wage does not immediately generate enough
additional purchasing power so as to overcome the aggregate-
demand deficiency. However, as purchasing power builds up due
to a falling goods price and hence an increasing real wage, after
23 periods the economy enters into a state of Classical Unemploy-
ment (excess demand on the goods market and excess supply on
the labor market) and expectations switch endogenously to being
inflationary. This pushes aggregate demand further up and full-
employment output is reached after 28 periods, when the economy
enters into the regime of Repressed Inflation (excess demand on
both markets). Thereafter the inflation rate decreases again and
the economy eventually settles at the quasi-stationary inflation-
ary state given by (15). The introduction of downward nominal
wage rigidity, by increasing the real wage has reinforced house-
holds’ purchasing power, which has rendered possible to exit from
the recessionary state.25
25That, on the contrary, downward wage flexibility could impede to over-
come the deflationary recession is consistent with the following quotation from
The Economist (January 26th 2008, p.71): “. . . Japan’s six-year recovery . . .
has been pulled along by exports, and despite repeated predictions, household
spending has failed to take off. The reason is clear: though employment has
steadily increased, wages are stagnant or falling . . . ”
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Figure 7: Effect of inflationary expectations if ν1 = 0.025.
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Figure 8: Effect of inflationary expectations if ν1 = 0.06.
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Figure 9: Multiplicity of equilibria with self-confirming expecta-
tions
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8 Concluding remarks
We have presented a non-taˆtonnement dynamic macroeconomic
model involving temporary equilibria with constant prices and
stochastic rationing in each period, and price adjustment between
periods. The model allows for trade also when prices are not
at their market clearing levels, and consistent allocations are de-
scribed in every period, giving rise at the same time to a well
defined dynamics. This approach has enabled us to study, in a
general-equilibrium setting, the dynamic functioning of an econ-
omy in which disequilibrium phenomena like underemployment,
deflation/inflation and excess productive capacities are allowed to
occur. These disequilibrium situations typically arise because the
adjustment of prices to market imbalances is not instantaneous
but proceeds with finite speed only; thus their functioning as an
allocation device is imperfect, though not nil. As a consequence,
quantity adjustments have to take place, which complement prices
in their task of making trades feasible.
The fact that prices do, albeit not instantaneously, adjust in
our model allows us to also work out the possible negative effects
of too large a price and wage flexibility. If aggregate demand is
insufficient, price and wage flexibility together with the possibility
of a declining nominal money stock (due to government surpluses)
may lead to a quasi-stationary situation in which there is perma-
nent deflation of nominal variables but all real variables - among
which most importantly employment - remain constant. This is
so if the decrease in nominal money is proportional to the one in
price and wage, because then the real stock of money held by con-
sumers does not change. Thus it is possible that, in addition to
the real wage, also the real wealth of households remains constant
or, in other words, there is no real-balance effect. Vice versa, if
the nominal wage is rigid downwards, then the real wage is even-
tually bound to increase, and aggregate-demand deficiency cannot
persist in the long run.
As explained in the paper, the presence of inventories is deci-
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sive for these results to hold. Without them, labor demand does
not diminish persistently enough in case of a recessionary shock to
trigger a continuing fall in the nominal wage. In their presence, on
the contrary, there is a sustained spillover from the goods market
to the labor market that eventually translates into a permanent
reduction of the real wage.
A further dynamic element in our model are consumers’ ex-
pectations. Enabling them to store the good from their first to
their second period of life, they anticipate future purchases when
holding inflationary expectations. This has allowed us to study
the role of expectations in the attempt to overcome a deflationary
recession.
Numerical simulations of our dynamic system confirm that
money is not necessarily neutral in the long run. Starting from
a Walrasian equilibrium, a restrictive monetary shock can cause
the economy to end up in a permanent recession, i.e. in a de-
flationary quasi-stationary Keynesian state in which employment
and output are permanently below their Walrasian levels. Sym-
metrically, an expansionary monetary shock typically results in a
quasi-stationary state of Repressed Inflation. Moreover, while our
simulations suggest that the Walrasian equilibrium is locally un-
stable, the recessionary deflationary and the inflationary equilibria
appear to be locally stable.
Our constructive approach to the modeling of expectations has
rendered possible to obtain a truly forward dynamics in which
there is multiplicity of self-confirming perfect-foresight equilibria
depending on whether expectations are assumed to be deflationary
or inflationary. If they are endogenized, endogenous switching be-
tween deflationary and inflationary guarantees that expectations
are correct along any trajectory of the dynamic system.
In a policy perspective, we have used our framework to inves-
tigate possible remedies to deflationary recessions, focusing on a
mix of fiscal and monetary policy similar to that recently imple-
mented by the Japanese government and by the Bank of Japan,
confirming that it points in the right direction for restoring full
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employment. In severe liquidity-trap situations, however, such a
policy may be insufficient, and then the inducement of inflationary
expectations should be considered as a further policy option. If
they can effectively be generated, they will allow the economy to
exit from the liquidity trap by boosting aggregate demand, pro-
vided the demand deficiency is not too dramatic. When this is the
case the introduction of downward rigidity (and upward flexibility)
of the nominal wage is a further useful measure as – with falling
prices – it increases consumers’ purchasing power and aggregate
demand.
It is worth emphasizing that these results depend crucially on
the possibility of modelling the quantity spillover effects between
markets in disequilibrium, which in turn is rendered possible us-
ing as modelling strategy the non-taˆtonnement approach and the
adoption of the concept of equilibrium with stochastic quantity
rationing.
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Appendix 1
Lemma A.1 When b ≤ 1−σ, the solution to the firm’s maxi-
mization problem is independent of the constraint dt ≤ dtαt
[
f
(
dt
)
+ st
]
.
Proof. The first order condition for an interior solution of the
firm’s problem is
γsf ′ () = α ⇔ γs bf ()

= α ⇔  = γs bf ()
α
.
Moreover the inequalities 1b ≥ 11−σ ≥ 1−γ
sσ
1−σ yield 1 ≤ 1−σb(1−γsσ) .
From this follows
 ≤ γ
s (1− σ)
1− γsσ
1
γs
1
b
 = d
1
γs
1
b
 = d
1
γs
1
b
γs
bf ()
α
=
d
α
f () ,
which proves our claim. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Since we hold {αt,mt, πt, St }, (G, tax) and τ fixed, we omit
these variables whenever possible as arguments in the subsequent
functions. Define the set
H ≡
{(
λsLs, γdXd (λs)
)
|
(
λs, γd
)
∈ [0, 1]2
}
and its subsets H
K ≡ H |λs<1,γd=1, HI ≡ H |λs=1,γd<1, HC ≡
H |λs<1,γd<1 and HU ≡ H |λs=1,γd=1 . Using the terminology
introduced by Honkapohja and Ito (1985), we derive from these
the consumption sector’s trade curves
H
K
0 ≡ HK + {(0,mt +G)}
=
{(
λsLs, Xd (λs) +mt +G
)
| λs ∈ [0, 1)
}
,
H
I
0 ≡
{(
Ls, γdXd (1) +mt +G
)
| γd ∈ (0, 1)
}
∪{(Ls, δmt +G) | δ ∈ (0, 1]} ∪ {(Ls, εG) | ε ∈ [0, 1]} ,
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H
C
0 ≡
{(
λsLs, γdXd (λs) +mt +G
)
|
(
λs, γd
)
∈ [0, 1)× (0, 1)
}
∪{(λsLs, δmt +G) | (λs, δ) ∈ [0, 1)× (0, 1]}
∪ {(λsLs, εG) | (λs, ε) ∈ [0, 1)× [0, 1]} .
and
H
U
0 ≡ HU + {(0,mt +G)} =
{(
Ls, Xd (1) +mt +G
)}
.
Similarly, starting from
F ≡
{(
λdLd (γs) , γsY s
(
λd, γs
))
|
(
λd, γs
)
∈ [0, 1]2
}
we define the production sector’s trade curves as F
K ≡ F |λd=1,γs<1,
F
I ≡ F |λd<1,γs=1, FC ≡ F |λd=1,γs=1and FU ≡ F |λd<1,γs<1 . To
derive these curves, we begin with noticing that
γsY s
(
λd, γs;αt, St
)
=
αt
b
λdLd (γst ;αt) + γ
sSt. (A.1)
Indeed, by (5)
γsY s
(
λd, γs;αt, St
)
= γs
[
λdn′f
(
d (γst ;αt)
)
+ St
]
whereas from f () = ab follows f ′ () = bf() , which implies
f () = 1bf
′ () . Therefore
γsY s
(
λd, γs;αt, St
)
= γs
[
λdn′
1
b
f ′
(
d (γst ;αt)
)
d (γs;αt) + St
]
.
But γsf ′
(
d (γs;αt)
)
= αt from any producer’s optimizing behav-
ior, and thus
γsY s
(
λd, γs;αt, St
)
=
αt
b
λdn′d (γs;αt) + γsSt
=
αt
b
λdLd (γst ;αt) + γ
sSt.
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This implies immediately that
F
C
=
{(
Ld (1;αt) ,
αt
b
Ld (1;αt) + St
)}
.
Consider now
F
K
=
{(
Ld (γs;αt) , γ
sY s (1, γs;αt, St)
)
| γs ∈ [0, 1)
}
.
Then (A.1) yields
γsY s (1, γs;αt, St) =
αt
b
Ld (γst ;αt) + γ
sSt.
On the other hand, (4) implies
γs =
αt
ab
(
d (γst ;αt)
)1−b
=
αt
ab
(
Ld (γst ;αt)
n′
)1−b
and therefore
γsY s (1, γs;αt, St) =
αt
b
Ld (γst ;αt) +
αt
ab
(
Ld (γst ;αt)
n′
)1−b
St.
Since Ld (γst ;αt) is strictly increasing in γ
s
t , this yields
F
K
=
{(
L,
αt
b
L+
αt
ab
(
L
n′
)1−b
St
)
| 0 ≤ L < Ld (1;αt)
}
.
(A.2)
Consider next
F
I
=
{(
λdLd (1;αt) , Y
s
(
λd, 1;αt, St
))
| λd ∈ [0, 1)
}
.
By (A.1) Y s
(
λd, 1;αt
)
= αtb λ
dLd (1;αt) + St and therefore
F
I
=
{(
L,
αt
b
L+ St
)
| 0 ≤ L < Ld (1;αt)
}
.
Since αtab
(
L
n′
)1−b
= γs ≤ 1, F I is positioned above FK .
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Figure 11: The producers’ trade curves
Finally consider F
U
. It is given by
F
U
=
{(
λdLd (γs;αt) ,
αt
b
λdLd (γst ;αt) +
αt
ab
(
Ld (γst ;αt)
n′
)1−b
St
)
|
(
λd, γs
)
∈ [0, 1)2
}
(A.3)
Comparing with F
K
and F
I
, it is clear that F
U
is the set of
points contained between F
K
and F
I
. Figure 11 illustrates the
producers’ trade curves.
Using the consumption sector’s and the production sector’s
trade curves and indicating with Ac the closure of the set A, we
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now note that a pair
(
L, Y
) ∈ R2+ is a temporary equilibrium
allocation if and only if it is an element of the set
Z =
((
H
K
0
)c ∩ (FK)c) ∪ ((HI0)c ∩ (F I)c)
∪
((
H
C
0
)c ∩ (FC)c) ∪ ((HU0 )c ∩ (FU)c) .
To show existence of an equilibrium is equivalent to showing that
Z is not empty. To this end consider first the locus
(
H
K
0
)c
=
{(
λstL
s, Xd (λst ) +mt +G
)
| λst ∈ [0, 1]
}
and recall that
Xd (λst ) = τ [(1− tax)πt + αtλstLs] .
Defining the function
Γt (L) = τ [(1− tax)πt + αtL] +mt +G, L ≥ 0,
we see that
(
H
K
0
)c
is the part of the graph of Γt for which L ≤ Ls.
Next consider again the production sector’s trade curves. From
(A.2) we conclude that the locus
(
F
K
)c
is the part of the graph
of the function
Δt (L) =
αt
b
L+
αt
ab
(
L
n′
)1−b
St, L ≥ 0,
for which L ≤ Ld(1). Notice that the graphs of the functions
Γt and Δt always intersect. Indeed, Γ
′
t (L) = ταt and Γt (0) =
τ (1− tax)πt + mt + G > 0, whereas Δ′t (L) ≥ αtb > ταt (since
1/b > 1 ≥ τ) and Δt (0) = 0. Setting Δt (L) = Γt (L) yields
(7) with the unique solution denoted L˜ (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ) .
Therefore the equilibrium level on the labor market is
Lt = min
{
L˜ (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ) , L
d (1, αt) , L
s
}
= L (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ)
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whereas the one on the goods market is, by definition of the func-
tion Y (·),
Y t = Y (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ) .
This shows that the equilibrium allocation(
Lt, Y t
)
= (L (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ) ,Y (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ))
exists and is uniquely defined. 
Appendix 2: The complete dynamic system
The dynamic system is given by four different subsystems, one
for each of the equilibrium types K, I, C and U, and endoge-
nous regime switching. For given (G, tax) and τ ∈ {h, 1} , any
list (αt, πt,mt, St) gives rise to a uniquely determined equilibrium
allocation
(
Lt, Y t
)
being of one of the above types (or of an in-
termediate one). More precisely, equation (6) allows us to charac-
terize the type of equilibrium: if Lt = L˜ (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ),
the resulting equilibrium is of type K or a limiting case of it. If
Lt = L
d (1, αt), type C or a limiting case of it occurs. Finally,
if Lt = L
s, an equilibrium of type I or a limiting case results if
αt
b L
s+St ≤ τ (1− tax)πt+ταtLs+mt+G; otherwise the equilib-
rium is of type U . Regime switching may occur because
(
Lt, Y t
)
may be of type T ∈ {K, I, C, U} and (Lt+1, Y t+1) of type T ′ 	= T.
The above discussion and Proposition 1 allow us to determine
the expressions of those rationing coefficients that are possibly
smaller than one. This is summarized in the following corollary of
Proposition 1.
Corollary A.1 In case K, λst =
Lt
Ls and γ
s
t =
αt
ab
(
Lt
n′
)1−b
. In
case C, λst =
Lt
Ls and, in case I, λ
d
t =
Ls
Ld(1,αt)
. Moreover, in both
these latter cases,
(
γdt , δt, εt
)
=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
(
Y t−mt−G
τ(1−tax)πt+ταtLt , 1, 1
)
if Y t ≥ G+mt(
0, Y t−Gmt , 1
)
if G+mt > Y t ≥ G(
0, 0, Y tG
)
if Y t < G
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Finally, in case U , γst =
1
St
(
Y t − αtb Lt
)
and λdt = Lt/L
d (γst ;αt).
Proof. We start with case U. Then, by (A.3) it must be true
that
(
Lt, Y t
)
=
(
λdLd (γs;αt) ,
αt
b
λdLd (γst ;αt) +
αt
ab
(
Ld (γst ;αt)
n′
)1−b
St
)
.
Moreover by (4)
Ld (γs;αt) = n
′
(
γst ab
αt
) 1
1−b
.
Therefore
αt
b
λdLd (γst ;αt) +
αt
ab
(
Ld (γst ;αt)
n′
)1−b
St = Y t
⇔
αt
b
λdtL
d (γst ;αt) + γ
s
tSt = Y t.
Recalling that λdLd (γs;αt) = Lt and solving for γ
s
t yields the
claimed expression.
In all cases, the values of λst and λ
d
t are immediate by definition.
The value of γst in case K can be obtained using equation (4).
Finally, γdt , δt, εt are determined by means of Definition 1 and
equations (1) and (2). 
We can now give the explicit equations of all subsystems of the
dynamic system.
Keynesian Unemployment system
Employment level: Lt = L˜ (αt, πt,mt, St, G, tax, τ) .
Output level: Y t =
αt
b Lt +
αt
ab
(
Lt
n′
)1−b
St.
Rationing coefficients: λst =
Lt
Ls , λ
d
t = 1, γ
s
t =
αt
ab
(
Lt
n′
)1−b
,
γdt = 1, δt = εt = 1.
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Price inflation: θt = 1− μ1 (1− γst ) .
Real wage adjustment: αt+1 =
1−ν1(1−λst )
1−μ1(1−γst )αt.
Real profit: πt+1 =
1
θt
(
Y t − αtLt
)
.
Real money stock: mt+1 =
1
θt
[mt +G+ (1− tax)πt]− πt+1.
Inventories: St+1 = n
′a
(
abγst
αt
) b
1−b
+ St − Y t.
Repressed Inflation system
Lt = L
s.
Y t =
αt
b Lt + St.
λst = 1, λ
d
t =
Ls
Ld(1,αt)
; γst = 1.
If Y t ≥ G+mt, then γdt = Y t−mt−Gτ(1−tax)πt+ταtLt , δt = εt = 1;
if G+mt > Y t ≥ G, then γdt = 0, δt = Y t−Gmt , εt = 1;
if Y t < G, then γ
d
t = δt = 0, εt =
Y t
G .
θt = 1 + μ2
(
1− γdt +δt+εt3
)
.
αt+1 =
1+ν2(1−λdt )
1+μ2
(
1− γ
d
t +δt+εt
3
)αt.
πt+1 =
1
θt
(
Y t − αtLt
)
.
mt+1 =
1
θt
[δtmt + εtG+ (1− tax)πt]− πt+1.
St+1 = λ
d
tn
′a
(
ab
αt
) b
1−b
+ St − Y t.
Classical Unemployment System
Lt = L
d (1, αt) .
Y t =
αt
b Lt + St.
λst =
Lt
Ls , λ
d
t = 1, γ
s
t = 1;
if Y t ≥ G+mt, then γdt = Y t−mt−Gτ(1−tax)πt+ταtLt , δt = εt = 1;
if G+mt > Y t ≥ G, then γdt = 0, δt = Y t−Gmt , εt = 1;
if Y t < G, then γ
d
t = δt = 0, εt =
Y t
G .
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θt = 1 + μ2
(
1− γdt +δt+εt3
)
.
αt+1 =
1−ν1(1−λst )
1+μ2
(
1− γ
d
t +δt+εt
3
)αt
πt+1 =
1
θt
(
Y t − αtLt
)
.
mt+1 =
1
θt
[δtmt + εtG+ (1− tax)πt]− πt+1.
St+1 = n
′a
(
ab
αt
) b
1−b
+ St − Y t.
Underconsumption
Lt = L
s.
Y t = τ (1− tax)πt + ταtLs +mt +G.
λst = 1, λ
d
t =
Ls
Ld(γst ,αt)
=
(abγst )
1/(1−b)Ls
n′α1/(1−b)t
;
γst =
αt
ab
(
Lt
n′
)1−b
, γdt = 1, δt = εt = 1.
θt = 1− μ1 (1− γst ) .
αt+1 =
1+ν2(1−λdt )
1−μ1(1−γst )αt.
πt+1 =
1
θt
(
Y t − αtLt
)
.
mt+1 =
1
θt
[mt +G+ (1− tax)πt]− πt+1.
St+1 = λ
d
tn
′a
(
γst ab
αt
) b
1−b
+ St − Y t.
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